Llamadas de contrato constantes de web3 que devuelven valores inconsistentes

Tengo este dapp en la red principal aquí .

El siguiente contrato se ha desplegado en esta dirección :

pragma solidity ^0.4.19;

import 'zeppelin-solidity/contracts/ownership/Ownable.sol';
import 'zeppelin-solidity/contracts/lifecycle/Destructible.sol';
import 'zeppelin-solidity/contracts/lifecycle/Pausable.sol';
import 'zeppelin-solidity/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol';

contract CryptoTwittos is Ownable, Pausable, Destructible {
  using SafeMath for uint;

  // A Twitto is owned by a stealer and has a price
  struct Twitto {
    address stealer;
    uint price;
  }

  // Look up Twitto by ids
  mapping(uint => Twitto) public twittos;

  // All Twitto ids and counter
  uint[] public twittoIds;
  uint public twittosCounter;


  // Fire event when steal happens
  event stealEvent(
    uint indexed id,
    address indexed owner,
    uint price,
    address indexed stealer,
    uint newPrice
  );


  // Get twittoIds
  function getTwittoIds(bool all) public view returns (uint[]) {
    // Return empty array if counter is zero
    if (twittosCounter == 0) return new uint[](0);

    if (all) {
      // Return all of them
      return twittoIds;

    } else {
      // Create memory array to store filtered ids
      uint[] memory filteredIds = new uint[](twittosCounter);
      // Store number of belongings
      uint twittosCount = 0;

      for (uint i = 0; i < twittosCounter; i++) {
        // Check if stealer is sender
        if (twittos[twittoIds[i]].stealer == msg.sender) {
          filteredIds[twittosCount] = twittoIds[i];
          twittosCount++;
        }
      }

      // Copy the filteredIds array into a smaller array
      uint[] memory trophies = new uint[](twittosCount);
      for (uint j = 0; j < twittosCount; j++) {
        trophies[j] = filteredIds[j];
      }
      return trophies;
    }
  }

  // Steal a Twitto by paying its price and setting a new one
  function steal(uint id, uint256 newPrice) payable whenNotPaused public {

    // look up the twitto and put on storage
    Twitto storage _twitto = twittos[id];

    // Prevent self stealing!
    require(msg.sender != _twitto.stealer);

    // Make sure the sender pays the right price
    require(msg.value == _twitto.price);

    // Make sure that the new price is higher than the old price
    require(newPrice > _twitto.price);

    // Transfer value with the 1% dev fee
    if (msg.value > 0) {
      _twitto.stealer.transfer(msg.value.mul(99).div(100));
    }

    // Push new Twitto if not existing
    if (_twitto.price == 0) {
      twittoIds.push(id);
      twittosCounter++;
    }

    // Trigger event
    stealEvent(id, _twitto.stealer, _twitto.price, msg.sender, newPrice);

    // Store new stealer
    _twitto.stealer = msg.sender;

    // Store new price
    _twitto.price = newPrice;

  }

  function withdraw() public onlyOwner {

    // Transfer balance to owner
    msg.sender.transfer(address(this).balance);
  }


}

El método constante que está causando problemas es getTwittoIds: todo funcionaba bien, pero luego el tamaño de las matrices creció un poco (como puede ver con la cantidad de transacciones en Etherscan ) y ahora esta llamada de método constante a veces devuelve una matriz vacía y a veces no.

Al leer preguntas como esta , pensé que esto se debía a que el límite de gas era demasiado bajo (para llamadas constantes), pero el problema sigue ocurriendo.

Los pasos más fáciles para reproducir este "error" son los siguientes:

1. Vaya a https://cryptotwittos.com/
2. Asegúrate de que MetaMask esté habilitado
3. Abrir consola

4. Obtener contrato con abi:

   var CT = web3.eth.contract([{"constant":true,"inputs":[],"name":"twittosCounter","outputs":[{"name":"","type":"uint256"}],"payable":false,"stateMutability":"view","type":"function"},{"constant":false,"inputs":[],"name":"unpause","outputs":[],"payable":false,"stateMutability":"nonpayable","type":"function"},{"constant":true,"inputs":[],"name":"paused","outputs":[{"name":"","type":"bool"}],"payable":false,"stateMutability":"view","type":"function"},{"constant":false,"inputs":[],"name":"destroy","outputs":[],"payable":false,"stateMutability":"nonpayable","type":"function"},{"constant":false,"inputs":[],"name":"pause","outputs":[],"payable":false,"stateMutability":"nonpayable","type":"function"},{"constant":true,"inputs":[],"name":"owner","outputs":[{"name":"","type":"address"}],"payable":false,"stateMutability":"view","type":"function"},{"constant":true,"inputs":[{"name":"","type":"uint256"}],"name":"twittos","outputs":[{"name":"stealer","type":"address"},{"name":"price","type":"uint256"}],"payable":false,"stateMutability":"view","type":"function"},{"constant":true,"inputs":[{"name":"","type":"uint256"}],"name":"twittoIds","outputs":[{"name":"","type":"uint256"}],"payable":false,"stateMutability":"view","type":"function"},{"constant":false,"inputs":[{"name":"newOwner","type":"address"}],"name":"transferOwnership","outputs":[],"payable":false,"stateMutability":"nonpayable","type":"function"},{"constant":false,"inputs":[{"name":"_recipient","type":"address"}],"name":"destroyAndSend","outputs":[],"payable":false,"stateMutability":"nonpayable","type":"function"},{"anonymous":false,"inputs":[{"indexed":true,"name":"id","type":"uint256"},{"indexed":true,"name":"owner","type":"address"},{"indexed":false,"name":"price","type":"uint256"},{"indexed":true,"name":"stealer","type":"address"},{"indexed":false,"name":"newPrice","type":"uint256"}],"name":"stealEvent","type":"event"},{"anonymous":false,"inputs":[],"name":"Pause","type":"event"},{"anonymous":false,"inputs":[],"name":"Unpause","type":"event"},{"anonymous":false,"inputs":[{"indexed":true,"name":"previousOwner","type":"address"},{"indexed":true,"name":"newOwner","type":"address"}],"name":"OwnershipTransferred","type":"event"},{"constant":true,"inputs":[{"name":"all","type":"bool"}],"name":"getTwittoIds","outputs":[{"name":"","type":"uint256[]"}],"payable":false,"stateMutability":"view","type":"function"},{"constant":false,"inputs":[{"name":"id","type":"uint256"},{"name":"newPrice","type":"uint256"}],"name":"steal","outputs":[],"payable":true,"stateMutability":"payable","type":"function"},{"constant":false,"inputs":[],"name":"withdraw","outputs":[],"payable":false,"stateMutability":"nonpayable","type":"function"}])
   

5. Obtener Instancia

   var CTInstance = CT.at("0xa4b9054417ee4f06453152a45ebeba7786c84c66")
   

6. Método de llamada que debería devolver todos los TwittoIds

   CTInstance.getTwittoIds(true, console.log)
   

7. Convénzase de que el método no debe devolver una matriz vacía

   CTInstance.twittosCounter(console.log)
   

Después de dos días de investigación todavía no tengo ni idea de lo que está pasando , por lo que cualquier ayuda sería muy apreciada.

¡Muchas gracias!